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PAUL BREST'S BRIEF FOR AN
IMPERIAL JUDICIARY
RAOUL BERGER*
"he who thinks the old embankments useless and destroys
them, is sure to suffer from the desolation caused by
overflowing water."
Confucius**
Professor Paul Brest's article "The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding"' might better have been entitled "The Con-
stitution is Dead." For after an exhaustive, Linnean-type classification
of interpretive approaches - originalism, non-originalism, textualism,
intentionalism, strict intentionalism, moderate intentionalism, etc., etc.
- he sweeps all aside and mounts a challenge to the assumption "that
judges and other public officials were bound by the text or original
understanding of the Constitution."2 That judges are sworn "to support
this Constitution" is of no moment. Richard Nixon, thou art vindicated.3
* A.B., 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D., 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M.,
1938, Harvard University; LL.D., 1978, University of Michigan.
** W. DuRANr, OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 673 (16th ed. 1954); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 659 (1961): "nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its existence."
1. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brest].
2. Id. at 224.
3. Madison stated in the Convention "1. the collective interest & security were much
more in the power belonging to the Executive than to the Judiciary department. 2. in the
administration of the former much greater latitude is left to opinion and discretion than in
the administration of the latter." 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34 (1911). Nixon might therefore assert greater freedom than
Warren.
The lesson of the Warren Court was not lost on the Nixon administration. Donald
E. Santarelli, an Associate Deputy Attorney General, who described himself in April,
1973, as in charge of "an idea shop" which "work[sl on concepts" and "plans" for the
President, stated that the Constitution "is what you can interpret it to mean in the light of
modern needs . . . . [We are using the [constitutional I issues for the self-serving purpose
of striking a new balance of power. . . . Today the whole Constitution is up for grabs."
THE NEW YORKER, April 28, 1973, at 32-34.
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The Constitution is Binding
Faced by the fact that the Court is imposing its own values on the
people,4 often in defiance of the framers' intentions, Brest grasps the
nettle: "What authority," he asks, "does the written Constitution have
in our system of constitutional government?" And he answers that "the
authority of the Constitution derives from the consent of its adopters."
But "their consent cannot bind succeeding generations. We did not
adopt the Constitution, and those who did are dead and gone,"5 the old
refrain - "The Founding Fathers cannot rule us from their graves."6
Since the judiciary itself is a creature of the Constitution, what becomes
of judicial authority?7 Like the Pope, the Court has no battalions. What
prevents us from "thrust[ing] aside the dead hand of Earl Warren,"8 an
act Brest regards as impious. 9
4. "Why should not the Court acknowledge that the source of newly-invented rights
is not the Constitution but the enhanced seriousness of certain values in our society?"
White, Reflections on the role of the Supreme Court: the contemporary debate and the
'lessons' of history, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 168 (1979). See also Forrester, Are We Ready for
Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212, 1215 (1977). See also Robert Cover at note 75 infra.
5. Brest, supra note 1, at 225. That analysis could prove counterproductive. The
Northern workingman who has logged twenty years of seniority may justly complain,
when bumped to make way for a newly-employed black, so that past injustices to blacks
may be redressed, that he is not bound by the sins of his dead forbears, the less since the
North did not participate in the misdeeds of the Southern slavocracy. "Punishing people
for their parents' transgressions is outlawed as a substantively unfair outcome .... " J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 92 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as ELY].
"It might be thought," Brest states, "that judges and other officials have expressly
consented to be bound by the Constitution by virtue of their oath of office 'to support this
Constitution'. . . . Cf. Eakin v. Raub, 12 S.&R. 330, 352-53 (Pa. 1825) (the oath 'is
designed rather as a test of the political principles of the man, than to bind the officer in
the discharge of his duty')." Brest, supra note 1, at 225 n.80. Judge Gibson added that
"otherwise, it were difficult to determine, what operation it is to have in the case of a
recorder of deeds, for instance, who, in the execution of his office, has nothing to do with
the Constitution." But Gibson went on to say, "the oath was more probably designed to
secure the powers of each of the different branches from being usurped by any of the rest;
for instance, to prevent . . . the supreme court from attempting to control the legislature."
Id. Eakin is a strange citation for untethered judicial discretion, for Gibson's famous
dissent rejected judicial review altogether.
6. Miller, Book Review, Washington Post, Nov. 13, 1977, § E, at 4, col. 1, § E, at 8,
col. 1.
7. The Massachusetts House wrote to the Earl of Shelburne in 1768 that "the
Constitution is fixed; it is from thence, that the legislature derives its authority; therefore
it cannot change the constitution without destroying its own foundation." H. COMMACER,
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 65 (7th ed. 1963). Madison stated in the Federal
Convention that "it would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could
change the Constitution under which it held its existence." 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 92-93 (1911). For similar remarks, see 2 WRITINGS OF
SAMUEL ADAMS 325 (H. Cushing ed. 1906); G. WOODS, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 277 (1969).
8. Sobran, Taking the Fourteenth, 30 NAT'L REV. 283, 284 (1978).
9. See text accompanying note 195 infra.
BRIEF FOR AN IMPERIAL JUDICIARY
For Brest, the "authority of the American Constitution" is
"questionable."' 0 But by his own testimony it has yet to be questioned
by the American people: "the written Constitution lies at the core of the
American 'civil religion.' Not only judges and other public officials, but
the citizenry at large habitually invoke the Constitution .. ". He
notes "the felt need to justify decisions by invoking the authority of the
Constitution,"'12 without which the people would not swallow busing,
affirmative action, anti-death penalty and pornography decrees. He
acknowledges that the "Constitution remains the governing document
of the United States. It establishes the national government, its
branches and offices .. ,"I From Brest's own recitals it therefore
appears that the people "consent" to the Constitution as "the governing
document of the United States." His demand for recurrent expressions of
"consent" would reduce us to a nation of schoolboys who mechanically
pledge allegiance to the flag every morning, contrary to the rule that an
enactment remains in force until superseded or repealed.' 4
Of course the dead cannot bind us; nor did they seek to do so.
Instead, the Framers provided us with an instrument of change -
amendment pursuant to article V. "The real issue," as Professor Willard
Hurst perceived in 1954, "is who makes the policy choices in the
twentieth century: judges or the combination of legislature and
electorate that makes constitutional amendments."' 5
The Founders' postulates were summarized by Professor Philip
Kurland:
The concept of the written constitution is that it defines the
authority of government and its limits, that government is the
10. Brest, supra note 1, at 225.
11. Id. at 234.
12. Id. at 235.
13. Id. at 236.
14. Judge Learned Hand stated that the judge "has no right to divination of public
opinion which runs counter to its last formal expression." L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY
14 (1952).
Reiterated "consent" is not, however, essential to the "binding" effect of judicial
decisions. Here Brest holds that for the "nonoriginalist," who "purposely departs from the
text and original understanding; the very endurance of deviant doctrine is evidence that it
reflects contemporary norms and hence becomes an independent basis for its legitimacy."
Brest, supra note 1, at 232 n.108. Why does not the "enduring" attachment of the people to
their "civil religion," the Constitution, equally attest that "it reflects contemporary
norms?" Resistance to busing, abortion, death penalty decrees testify that the Court's
"deviant doctrine" does not "reflect contemporary norms."
15. Hurst, Discussion on The Process of Constitutional Construction in SUPREME
COURT & SUPREME LAW 75 (E. Cahn ed. 1954). "The issue," Professor Gary Leedes
concluded, is "Who should decide." Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361,
1444 (1979). Even more basic is the question, where was the power to make ultimate
policy decisions conferred on the Court? See text accompanying notes 126-138 infra.
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creature of the constitution and cannot do what it does not
authorize .... A priori, such a constitution could only have a fixed
and unchanging meaning, if it were to fulfill its function. For
changed conditions, the instrument itself made provision for
amendment which, in accordance with the concept of a written
constitution, was expected to be the only form of change . ... "
So much was adumbrated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, which Brest regards as "establishing" judicial review:
The powers of the legislature [and the courts] are defined and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited,
and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained? 7
Marshall added that the Framers contemplated the Constitution "as a
rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature."'" Brest
notes that the leading Reconstruction authority on constitutional law,
Chief Justice Thomas Cooley, considered that "the meaning of the
constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different at any
time when a court has occasion to pass upon it,"' 9 and that the Court
reiterated this view in 1895.20 The new-born activist doctrine that the
Constitution is no longer binding, that it is for the Court to supply a
16. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1978). Justice William
Paterson, one of the influential Framers, held, "[tihe Constitution is certain and fixed; it
contains the permanent will of the people . . . and can be revoked or altered only by the
authority that made it." Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 303, 308 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1795).
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). For a subsequent paraphrase, see Poindexter v.
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 291 (1885).
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80.
19. Brest, supra note 1, at 208; T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 124 (8th ed.
1927). See also text accompanying note 180 infra.
20. Brest, supra note 1, at 208; South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448
(1895). Lest this seem too old-fashioned, mark that Brest himself wrote, "suppose that the
Constitution provided that some acts were to be performed 'bi-weekly'. At the time of the
framing of the Constitution, this meant only 'once every two weeks'; but modern
dictionaries bowing to pervasive misuse, now report 'twice a week' (i.e. semi-weekly) as an
acceptable definition. To construe the definition now to mean 'semi-weekly' would
certainly be a change of meaning (and an improper one at that)." P. BREST, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 146 n.38 (1975). Why should greater weight attach to
such usage than to the unmistakable intention recorded in debates that the framers meant
"bi-weekly?"
Professor Willard Hurst wrote, "[i]f the idea of a document of superior legal
authority is to have meaning, terms which have a precise, history-filled content to those
who draft and adopt the document must be held to that precise meaning." Hurst, supra
note 15, at 57.
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new ideology,2 1 confesses that the Warren Court's "revolution ''22 cannot
be justified under the Constitution. That is why Brest, who experiences
no difficulty in jettisoning a basic premise of our system which was
judicially sanctioned for 150 years, is aghast that the decisions under
the fourteenth amendment, about thirty to thirty-five years old, should
be questioned.2 3
Brest maintains, however, that "the practice of supplementing and
derogating from the text and original understanding is itself part of our
constitutional tradition., 24 That is a bland apology for judicial arroga-
tion, for the Court early held that "judges cannot remedy political
imperfections, nor supply any legislative omission[s]. 25 They cannot,
said Marshall, "change that instrument. "26 Usurpation is no more
legitimated by repetition 27 than is larceny; the last infraction stands no
higher than the first. Consequently the "fact of this tradition" does not
"undermine the exclusivity of the written document., 28 No more than
other men can judges lift themselves by their bootstraps. Nor can
judicial "derogation" from the "written word" rest on long-continued
acquiescence by the American people, for as Brest himself recognizes,
"tacquiescence is not the same as 'consent', which must be informed and
knowingly and freely given., 29 These conditions have not in fact been
met. The Court has never nakedly avowed that it was acting contrary to
the Constitution; instead it has constantly pretended to act as the voice
21. See Robert Cover, at note 75 infra.
22. So a faithful activist described it. Kelly, Clio and the Constitution: An Illicit Love
Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 158. Stanley Kutler, one of Brest's authorities, observed
that the "result-oriented jurisprudence" of the Warren Court "witnessed the crumbling of
sometimes century-old precedents and the charting of new political and social goals .. "
Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History of Ahistorical?, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 511, 514 (1979).
23. See text accompanying note 195 infra. Many far older precedents were jettisoned
by the Warren Court: "The list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court reads like a
table of contents from an old constitutional law casebook." P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 90-91 (1970).
24. Brest, supra note 1, at 225 (emphasis added).
25. United States v. Worral, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 395 (1798). In behalf of the Court,
Justice Brandeis declared, "[t]o limit the power of the states as urged 'would involve not a
construction of the Amendment but a rewriting of it .... Finch & Co. v. McKittrick,
305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939).
26. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed.
1969).
27. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969); Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827). "[T]hat people have always been tempted to steal does
not mean that stealing is what they should be doing." J. ELY, supra note 5, at 44.
28. Brest, supra note 1, at 225-26.
29. Id. at 226; see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 155, 353-54 (1977).
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of the Constitution, so that activists themselves are beginning to urge
"truth in advertising. '" 3
0
Brest perceives the connection between informed consent and
legitimacy.
It is simply anti-democratic to conceal something as fundamental as
the nature of constitutional decisionmaking - especially if conceal-
ment is motivated by the fear that the citizenry wouldn't stand for
the practice if it knew the truth. If the Court can't admit what it is
doing, then it shouldn't do it.
3 1
And he comments: "The premise that the government should be open
about its practices seems right, as does the implication that the
judiciary has not been fully candid about its decisionmaking process
.. .. *"32 But he concludes, "it is not plausible that the truth about
constitutional adjudication has been successfully hidden in the face of
almost two centuries of continual exposds of the Court's infidelities to
the original meaning of the Constitution - criticisms levied by
dissenting Justices, lawyers, politicians, and newspaper editors, as well
as scholars. 33
Brest's view was not shared by Professor Felix Frankfurter; he
advised President Franklin Roosevelt that "[pleople have been taught to
believe that when the Supreme Court speaks it is not they who speak
but the Constitution, whereas, of course . . . it is they who speak and
not the Constitution. And I verily believe that that is what the country
needs most to understand, 34 and still does not. Former Solicitor
General Robert Bork observed, "The Supreme Court regularly insists
that its results . . . do not spring from the mere will of the Justices...
but are supported, indeed compelled, by a proper understanding of the
Constitution. . . . Value choices are attributed to the Founding Fathers,
not to the Court. '35 The Warren Court would not accede to Justice
30. See note 4 supra.
31. Brest, supra note 1, at 234.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 235. A poll taken by Professor Walter Murphy in 1966 concluded that 55%
of the people were unaware of what the Court was doing; two-thirds of the remaining 45%
did not like the school segregation decisions. Hearings on the Supreme Court Before the
Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (June 1968).
34. ROOSEVELT & FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945 at 383 (M.
Freedman, ed. 1967). Shortly before Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson became a Justice
he wrote, "[tihis political role ['continuous constitutional convention'l of the Court has
been obscure to laymen - even to most lawyers," R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY Xi (1941), a fact to which I can testify on the basis of my own experience.
35. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
3-4 (1971). In a remarkable dissent, concurred in by three of his brethren, Judge Van
[VOL. 40
BRIEF FOR AN IMPERIAL JUDICIARY
Jackson's plea to tell the people that by the desegregation decision it
was "declaring new law for a new day."36 Richard Kluger, who charted
the course of that case, considered it "a scarcely reasonable request to
make of the brethren,"37 presumably for the reason voiced by Professor
Martin Shapiro: "It would be fantastic indeed if the Supreme Court, in
the name of sound scholarship, were to disavow publicly the myth on
which its power rests."3s As Bork remarked, "The way an institution
advertises tells you what it thinks its customers demand., 39 Consider,
too, academe's general reliance on Bickel's "open-ended" theory,4 °
recently translated by Professor John Hart Ely as an "invitation" the
framers extended to the Court to override their unmistakable
intention.4 ' In prominent quarters it still matters to preserve the myth
that the Court is effectuating the Constitution.
The Special "Competence" of the Courts
Activists cannot well insist that continuing "consent" is essential to
the binding effect of the written Constitution and dispense with
"consent" to the contra-constitutional conduct of the Court, to the
substitution of its "unwritten Constitution" for the written document.
To do him justice, Brest makes no such claim but adopts a suggestion of
Owen Fiss that the "legitimacy" of the courts "depends not on the
consent - implied or otherwise - of the people, but rather on their
Graafeiland of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "Rare indeed is the judge who
will concede that his decision departs in the slightest from the meaning and intent of the
carefully prepared text [of the Constitution]. The American public must be 'mercifully
soothed' into a belief that each judicial pronouncement, no matter how autocratic, is made
in compliance with the people's constitutional mandate." Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152,
172 (2d Cir. 1978).
The "popular view" is that the Court is "obtaining guidance from the Constitution
and the neutral principles rooted therein." Leedes, supra note 15, at 1413-14. Leedes asks,
"what will happen when the public realizes the extent to which the Court is politicized."
Id. at 1443. Compare Justice Black, writing for the Court: "The responsibility of this
Court, however, is to construe and enforce the Constitution and laws of the land as they
are and not to legislate social policy on the basis of our personal inclinations." Evans v.
Abney, 369 U.S. 435, - (1970).
36. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 681, 689 (1976).
37. Id. at 683.
38. M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1964). Respecting the
judges' practice of deciding cases "in accord with their personal conscience and judgment,"
Professor W. R. Forrester stated that his students "say that if the American people knew
they would have no confidence in the Court as the impartial arbiter .. " Forum: Equal
Protection and the Burger Court, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 675 (1975).
39. Bork, supra note 35, at 4.
40. For analysis of this theory, see R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 99-116 (1977).
41. For comment thereon, see Berger, Government by Judiciary: John Hart Ely's
"Invitation", 54 IND. L.J. 277 (1979).
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competence, on the special contribution they make to the quality of our
social life."42 Such a tenet was disclaimed by the Court. Speaking by
Justice Jackson, it declared:
[NIor does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of
official authority depend upon our possession of marked competence
in the field where the invasion of rights occurs . . . .But we act in
these matters not by authority of our competence but by force of our
commissions.43
Who is to determine that the courts are specially "competent" to
decide what "the quality of our social life" should be, or "those values
which are fundamental to our society.",44 Obviously not the people, for
42. Brest, supra note 1, at 226. Brest also suggests an "alternative theory," derived by
Ely from the Carolene Products footnote, United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152-53 n.4 (1939), limited to safeguarding "the integrity of majoritarian processes
and the rights of minorities," for Ely maintains that "courts are not competent to ascertain
and apply any other 'fundamental values."' Brest, supra note 1, at 227. For analysis of the
Ely theory, see Berger, Ely's "Theory of Judicial Review", 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 87 (1981). Here
it may be noted that this too is a judicial construct representing, as Professor George
Braden wrote, simply a part of one man's "set of values for his society," which he holds
strongly enough to enforce when opportunity arises. Braden, The Search for Objectivity in
Constitutional Law, 57 YALE L.J. 571, 588-89 (1948). Dean Terrance Sandalow observes
that the Carolene Products footnote rests upon "a conception of the judicial function that
cannot be reconciled with democratic values." Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities,
75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1163 (1977).
Earlier, Ely concluded that the framers of the fourteenth amendment had issued "an
open and across-the-board invitation to import into the constitutional decision process
considerations that will not be found in the amendment nor even . . . elsewhere in the
Constitution." The resultant "untethered" discretion was so "frightening" ("scary" he now
says), however, that he cautioned against its use in the absence of yet-to-be developed
limiting principles. Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND.
L.J. 399, 415, 425, 448 (1978). For my comments thereon see note 41 supra. Apparently his
revival of the Carolene Products footnote is to serve as the limiting principle. But Chief
Justice Stone, who had fathered the footnore, before long complained that "[t]he Court is
now in as much danger of becoming a legislative and Constitution making body, enacting
into law its own predilections" as its predecessors. A. MASON, SECURITY THROUGH FREEDOM:
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 145-46 (1955).
43. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639, 640 (1943).
44. Brest, supra note 1, at 227. Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo rejected the
"assumption that the responsibility for the preservation of our institutions is the exclusive
concern of any one of the three branches .. " United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87-88
(1936) (Stone, J., Brandeis & Cardozo, J.J., dissenting). Brest overlooks that the basic
issue "is not a question of judicial institutional capacity; it is rather one of judicial
constitutional legitimacy." Abraham, "Equal Justice Under Law" or "Justice At any Cost"?
The Judicial Role Revisited; Reflections on "Government by Judiciary"; Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 467, 470 (1979). More simply, that
one is an expert does not endow him with power to act in public affairs. Ely reminds us of
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Brest does not suggest that the issue be submitted to a referendum. Nor
can the legislature be within his contemplation, for the courts
habitually supersede and take over legislative functions, presumably on
the premise that they are more "competent." Thus the Court would
confer power on itself, as Brest acknowledges: "For better or for worse,
the judiciary has assumed a major role in protecting" both "individual
rights and decision-making through democratic processes., 45 Activist
outcries against the abortion decisions and Judge Garrity's take-over of
the Boston schools 46 indicate that the self-conferred power can be
Judge J. Skelly Wright's statement, "an argument for letting the experts decide... is an
argument for paternalism and against democracy." ELY, supra note 5, at 134.
Professor Louis Lusky observes that like "the now discredited substantive due
process doctrine of such cases as Lochner v. New York (1905)," "fundamental rights" leaves
"the Court entirely at large, with full freedom to enact its own natural law conceptions."
L. LUsKY, By WHAT RIGHT? 266 (1975), a result unabashedly embraced by Messrs. Brest
and Cover, see note 75 infra.
Compare with Brest's tribute to the special "competency" of the Justices,
Professor Alan Dershowitz's review of Justice William 0. Douglas' autobiography in Book
Review, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1980, at 9, col. 1 and 26. There he writes, that the Supreme
Court consists of nine men "who are generally mediocre lawyers, often former politicians
• . . almost always selected on the basis of political considerations." And he asks, "[how,
in a democratic society, can nine unelected and politically non-responsible men overrule
the policy choices of state legislatures, Congress, popular referenda. . . . Why should
judges have the last word . . . on such emotionally laden issues as abortion, busing, [and]
pornography . .. ?" He recounts Chief Justice Hughes's advice to the neophyte Justice
Douglas, "ninety percent of any [constitutional] decision is emotional. The rational part of
us supplies the reason for supporting our predilections." Then and there Douglas admitted
to himself that "the 'gut' reactions of a judge at the level of constitutional adjudication
.. . was the main ingredient of his decision." Excerpt from Justice Douglas' Autobiogra-
phy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1980, § (Magazine), at 39, 40. Why should millions of
Americans who consider, for example, that death penalties serve to deter murder, prefer
the "gut reaction" of the Justices to their own? We live under a government of laws, not of
gut reactions. And Dershowitz concludes that "Itihere will never be an entirely
satisfactory justification for the power of judges to overrule popular decisions." In fact the
alleged power is demonstrably a usurpation.
45. Brest, supra note 1, at 226 (emphasis added). Ely notices the "distrust of the
self-serving motives of those in power .. " J. ELY, supra note 5, at 136. Chief Justice
Denman observed that "Itihe practice of a ruling power in the State is but a feeble proof of
its legality." Stockdale v. Hansard, 112 E.R. 1112, 1171 (Q.B. 1839).
46. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf' A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973). Professor Henry Abraham admonishes the Court not to "view itself as a 'social
reform agency' [as] when it wrote what, in effect, constitutes a Federal Abortion Code.
... " Abraham, supra note 44, at 479. Similarly, though Abraham accepts the
desegregation decision, he rejects those that follow in its train: "[Tlhe court had no
constitutional mandate to turn itself . . . into a combination of national school board,
transportation expert, disciplinarian, employment manager and admissions director." Id.
at 480. See also Lusky, note 81 infra. Compare Brest's own split with the Court over its
Ramirez decision. See text accompanying notes 93-99 infra.
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exercised for the "worse." Consider Henry Steel Commager's scathing
comment on the pre 1937 Court.
[The record] discloses not a single case, in a century and a
half,where the Supreme Court has protected freedom of speech and
press. It reveals no instance. . . where the Court has intervened on
behalf of the underprivileged - the Negro, alien, women, children,
workers, tenant farmers. It reveals, on the contrary, that the Court
has effectively intervened, again and again, to defeat Congressional
attempts to free the slave, to guarantee civil rights to Negroes, to
protect workingmen, to outlaw child labor, to assist hard-pressed
farmers, and to democratize the tax system.4 7
Shortly before he was appointed to the Supreme Court, Solicitor General
Robert H. Jackson wrote, "time has proved that [the Court's] judgment
was wrong on most of the outstanding issues upon which it has chosen
to challenge the popular branches, 4 s a stricture confirmed by respected
scholars. 49 In their rapture over the Warren Court's adoption of their
"values," Brest and his ilk overlook that "[a] single generation's
experience with judicial review . . . does not wipe out the experience of
a century and a half."50 The Court may yet again turn against their
dearest convictions.
"Having abandoned both consent and fidelity to the text and
original understanding as the touchstones of constitutional decision-
making," Brest proposes "a designedly vague criterion"51 (a carping
critic may view it as a blank check), this to determine whether the
Court or the people themselves shall decide their destiny! So he cites
47. Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, 19 VA. Q. REV. 417, 428 (1943).
"Meanwhile," Professor Leonard Levy wrote, "millions of Negroes suffered lives of
humiliation for five or more decades . . . because the Court betrayed the intent of the
Reconstruction Amendments." L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 35
(1967).
Brest's rosy view of unfettered judicial discretion was not shared by Lord
Camden: "IThe discretion of a Judge isi the law of tyrants .... In the best it is
oftentimes caprice: In the worst it is every vice, folly and passion, to which human nature
is liable." Quoted in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 285 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In 1767, Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts said, "the Judge should
never be the Legislator: Because, then the Will of the Judge would be the Law: and this
tends to a State of Slavery." Quoted in Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental
Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPIETIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287, 292
(1971).
48. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL. SUPREMACY 37 (1941).
49. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW 279, 292-93 11957); Burns, "Dictatorship - Could it Happen
Here?", in HAS THE COURT Too MucLH PowER? 234, 236 (C. Roberts ed. 1974).
50. L. LEVY. supra note 47, at 23.
51. Brest, supra note 1, at 226 (emphasis added).
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Owen Fiss's argument that "the judiciary should give 'concrete meaning
and application to our constitutional values.' "52 Consider suffrage: the
unmistakable exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth amendment,
and subsequent resort to the fifteenth, nineteenth and twenty-sixth
amendments in order to admit blacks, women and eighteen-year olds to
suffrage evince the common understanding that suffrage was not an
immanent "value" but a creature of express grant. Certainly the
"values" of the fourteenth cannot honestly be invoked for "one
person-one vote" in the teeth of the exclusion of suffrage therefrom, a
fact Brest now acknowledges.5 3 Similarly, Brest concedes that "the
nation was not ready to eliminate ['school segregation'] in the 1860's" 54
but argues in defense of Chief Justice Warren's desegregation decision
that "the nation's values had shifted significantly by 1954."'S Yet he
admits that an amendment to abolish segregation would have failed:
"Imagine, if you will, the fate of an amendment proposed in the mid-50's
to protect Communists or to require school desegregation., 56 Even after
the desegregation decree there was massive resistance in both North
and South,57 and for long the Court could enlist neither Congress nor
the President to implement its drive. It was because the Court was well
aware of such public sentiment that it turned down Justice Jackson's
plea that it inform the people it was "declaring new law for a new
day. s58 To urge that such conduct gives "concrete meaning and
application to our constitutional values"5 9 is therefore to pervert
language and history. What the Court did was to abort them.
52. Id. at 227. Robert Bork points out that when the Court "chooses fundamental
values" it "makes rather than implements value choices," and that "cannot be squared
with the presuppositions of a democratic society." Bork, supra note 35, at 6.
53. See text accompanying notes 203-05 infra.
54. Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 11, at 10, col. 3. See note 204
infra.
55. Brest, supra note 1, at 230. Ely, however, doubts that "opinion nationwide . . .
had moved [by 19541 to the point of condemning 'separate but equal schooling.'" J. ELY,
supra note 5, at 66. Such racism "remains today a strong strain in American life." Id.
56. Brest, supra note 1, at 237.
57. Van Alstyne, Making Sense of Desegregation and Affirmative Action, 57 TEx. L.
REv. 1489, 1491 (1979). This segregation sequence is a fine exhibit for Brest's view that
the sources are "defeasible in the light of changing public values." Brest, supra note 1, at
229.
58. R. KLUGER, supra note 36, at 681, 689.
59. Brest, supra note 1, at 227.
60. See R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 60-64. In a tacit recantation, Alfred Kelly, an
activist who had been of counsel for the NAACP in the desegregation case, declared, "the
commitment to traditional state-federal relations meant that the radical Negro reform
program would be only a very limited one." (quoted in Brest, supra note 1, at 242).
Professor Don Fehrenbacher noticed a "widespread and tenacious resistance to the
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On a par with the Court's reversal of the Framers' exclusion of
suffrage and segregation from the scope of the fourteenth amendment, is
its interference with state administration of criminal law on the theory
that the amendment "incorporated" the Bill of Rights. In light of the
Framers' attachment to state sovereignty, the reservation by the tenth
amendment to the states of all rights not delegated to the federal
government, 60 it requires convincing evidence that the Framers in-
tended to surrender powers that ran beyond the Civil Rights Act.6 1
Justice Frankfurter asked Justice Black: "Is it conceivable that an
amendment" establishing a "uniform system of judicial procedure"
would have been "submitted" or "ratified?' 6 Charles Fairman's scrupu-
lous study, in which other scholars concur, 63 and which my own
research confirmed,6 4 refutes Black's historical theorizing. In stating
that "the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment . . . implicated venerable traditions of state diversity and
interventional federalism aggressively embodied... " D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED
Sco'rr CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 581 (1978).
Senator Frederick Frelinhuysen, a Framer and broad constructionist of the
fourteenth amendment, stated in 1871 that it must "not be used to make the General
Government imperial. It must be read in the light of our judicial history, and be read
together with the tenth amendment.. . . Thus reading the fourteenth amendment. . . I
do not consider it now expedient for the General Government to assume a general
municipal jurisdiction over crimes in the States." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 501.
Another leader, Senator Lyman Trumbull, also rejected a federal "right to pass a general
criminal code for the States .. " Id. at 579.
61. See Brest, supra note 1, at 235 and note 201 infra. In the course of the framing of
the fourteenth amendment, Senator James W. Patterson of New Hampshire, was "opposed
to any law discriminating against [blacks] in the security and protection of life, liberty,
person, property and the proceeds of their labor"; "beyond this," he said, "I am not
prepared to go." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2699 (1866). For other citations see R.
BERGER, supra note 29, at 170.
62. G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 261 (1977). See Senator
Frelinghuysen's remark, supra note 60.
63. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1949). Bickel considered that Fairman "conclusively disproved Justice Black's
contention; at least, such is the weight of opinion among disinterested observers." A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962). An activist, Professor Dean Alfange,
Jr. considers it "all but certain that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to
incorporate the Bill of Rights and thus to revolutionize the administration of criminal
justice in the states." Alfange, On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change:
Another Look at the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 603, 607 (1978). Another activist, Professor Michael Perry, concurs in my
view that "the proposition 'that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of
Rights' constitutes an invasion of rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment,
an invasion of such magnitude as to demand proof that such was the framers' intention."
Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 690 (1978).
64. Berger, supra note 29 at, 134-56. See also Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981).
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autonomy,"6 Brest obliquely concedes that it was a part of the
"constitutional decision-making concerning the allocation of powers...
[that] has not been particularly faithful to the text and original
understanding of the Constitution, '""6 an admirably chaste and re-
strained description of judicial arrogation. But he relies on "a changing
conception of federalism. I cannot prove the point, but the mature
doctrine, though not necessarily every judicial gloss on particular
clauses, seems responsive to current public norms." 67 How much "seems
responsive" because of the people's mistaken belief that the given
"gloss" was required by the Constitution rather than by the Justices it
is not necessary here to determine. "Particular glosses," however,
plainly run counter to the people's wishes with respect to pornography,
death penalties, busing, abortion and the like.68
A leading activist, Ely, has crushingly impeached the judicial
"competence" to ascertain "fundamental values," showing that a divorce
between a judge's personal values and the social consensus is delusory,
that what he is really discovering are his own values, and that judges
are by no means "best equipped to make moral judgments, in particular
that they are [not] better suited to the task than legislators. "69 Elbridge
Gerry had made a similar argument in the Convention, leading it to
65. BREST, supra note 1, at 233.
66. Id. at 237 n.124.
67. Id. at 233.
68. For citations, see B. BERGER, supra note 29, at 325-27. Noting Professor Lusky's
reference to current prejudice against minorities that "most people can discern simply by
examining their own attitudes," Professor Randall Bridwell shrewdly remarks, "IhIow the
Court . . .was 'driven' to make decisions, that 'people at large have accepted' but which,
oddly, run counter to deep-seated prejudices that have to be overriden by these judicial
decisions, is quite interesting." Bridwell, The Scope of Judicial Review: A Dirge for the
Theorists of Majority Rule?, 31 S. CAR. L. REV. 617, 632 n.62 (1980).
69. Ely, Forword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 16, 35
(1978). He notes that "Lenin used to claim this god-like gift of divination of the people's
'real' interests .. " Id. at 51 n.198. Experience has shown, activist Lusky wrote, "that
the Justices are not endowed with divine insights into the needs of a healthy society."
Lusky, supra note 44, at 107. See statement of Justice Jackson at text accompanying note
48 supra. Professor Leedes observes, "[eiquating the judge's political philosophy ... with
the community's 'constitutional morality' is a ploy to conceal the truism that the judge's
philosophy is a starting premise that is not empirically verifiable." Leedes, supra note 15,
at 1385.
Alexander Bickel, whom Brest recommended to me, Brest, supra note 54, at 44,
wrote that were the ultimate "reality" that judicial review spells nothing more than
"personal preference," then judicial "authority over us is wholly intolerable and totally
irreconcilable with the theory and practice of political democracy." A BICKEL, TiiE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 80 (1962). "A sceptic," Brest states, "might in any case question the
judges' ability to discern fundamental public or social values." Nevertheless, he argues,
adjudication "is better than originalism." This is a sad basis for setting aside an
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reject judicial participation in the presidential veto of legislation: "It
was quite foreign from the nature of the office to make them judges of
the policy of public measures." Nathaniel Gorham observed that judges
"are not to be presumed to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere
policy of public measures."7 ° In truth, judicial divination of "certain
enduring values ''7 1 is a chimera. For as Professor Mark Tushnet points
out, "the fragmentation of American society makes it impossible to
support the view that a single set of intuitions is pervasively shared
... *72 Ours is a society composed of many diverse groups having
quite different ideas as to what constitutes the good life.
If values are not derived from the Constitution, but in Alexander
Bickel's words, from the "evolving morality of our tradition, 73 - a
euphemism for judicial soothsaying - what, asks Dean Terrance
Sandalow, are courts "to look for"? If values "change over time, by what
standard are courts to determine whether a particular step in the
evolutionary process is or is not permissible"? 74 These are pragmatic
objections; more disquieting is the fact that he who defines our
unmistakable determination by framers and ratifiers, as in the case of their exclusion of
suffrage from the fourteenth amendment.
Brest's fellow activist, Arthur S. Miller, concluded that the Justices have not been
prepared "for the task of constitutional interpretation .. " Miller, The Elusive Search
For Values in Constitutional Interpretation, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 487, 500 (1979). Few
have "the broad gauged approach and knowledge" essential to "search for and identify the
values that should be sought in constitutional adjudication." Id. at 507. And the Justices
labor under the grave disadvantage of employing what Miller terms the "faulty"
"adversary system as a means of settling public policy," faulty on at least three scores -
the competence of the personnel, an inability to measure the consequences of alternative
decision and the flow of information to the judges." The "system itself," he sums up, "is
inadequate to the need." Id. at 508.
70. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 97-98; id. at Vol. 2 at 73.
71. Brest, supra note 1, at 227. Academe applauds Supreme Court decisions as
"embodiments of principles of justice, defined as the standard political principles of the
moderate-left of the Democratic party." Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way:
An Interpretation of the Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307,
1322 (1979).
72. Tushnet, supra note 71, at 1320. Leeds also notes the absence of "shared values."
Leedes, supra note 15, at 1390. Robert Bork points out that when the Court "chooses
fundamental values," it "makes rather than implements value choices," and that "cannot
be squared with the suppositions of a democratic society." Bork, supra note 35, at 10-11.
73. A. BICKEL, supra note 69, at 236. "[Olur society does not, rightly does not, accept
the notion of a discoverable and objectively valid set of moral principles, at least not a set
that could plausibly serve to overturn the decisions of our elected representatives." J. Eiy,
supra note 5, at 56. The claim that "our 'insulated' judiciary has done a better job of
speaking for our better moral selves turns out to be historically shaky." Id. at 57.
74. Sandalow, supra note 42, at 1181. As late as 1918, Justice Holmes stated that the
"Court always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of policy or
morals." Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1918) (dissenting opinion in which
Justices McKenna, Brandeis and Clarke concurred).
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"fundamental values" rules the nation, a result from which ideologues
like Brest and Robert Cover do not shrink.7 5 Against such "dan-
gerous discretion to roam at large in the trackless field of their own
imaginations,"7 " an historically clear legislative intention offers a safer
mooring. Moreover, as Professor Richard Kay observes:
To implement real limits on government the judge must have
reference to standards which are external to, and prior to, the
matter to be decided. This is necessarily historical investigation.
The content of those standards are set at their creation. Recourse to
"the intention of the framers" in judicial review, therefore, can be
considered as indispensable to realizing the ideas of government
limited by law.77
Brest argues in favor of judicial governance that judges are
"independent., 7 ' That very fact, their unaccountability, argues against
handing political policy over to them. Judicial "independence" was not
meant to dissolve "limits" on judicial power or to deprive the people of
control over policy-making. In what Brest concedes is "an idealized
description" of judicial method, he prefers rule by judges because they
articulate the reasons for their decisions.79 But activists themselves are
most unhappy on this score; they variously assail the decisions as
"gibberish,"8 0 "wanton";8 ' others point to "lunatic," "inconsistent"
decisions, s 2 a veritable "shambles,' ' 3 upon which academicians vainly
75. Cover asserted, "a reading of the Constitution must stand or fall not upon the
Constitution's self-evident meaning nor upon the intentions of the 1787 or 1866 framers
... [Ilt is for us, not the framers, to decide whether that end of liberty is best served by
entrusting the judges a major role in defining our governing political ideals and in
measuring the activity of the primary actors in majoritarian politics against that
ideology." Cover, Book Review, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27. Contrast with
Brest's the "sources are . . . defeasible in the light of changing public values," Brest,
supra note 1, at 229, Sandalow's statement that "if constitutional law is to evolve over
time, the legitimacy of the changes depends upon popular consent expressed through a
democratic political process .. " Sandalow, supra note 42, at 1189.
76. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1858).
77. Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REV. 801, 805-06 (1978); see also Leedes, supra
note 35, at 1397. For Judge Learned Hand's reliance on "historical meaning," see L. HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 65 (1962).
78. Brest, supra note 1, at 228.
79. Id.
80. See text accompanying note 87 infra.
81. Activist Lusky, who defends the desegregation decision, condemns the post-1968
school cases because they have "led to grotesquely destructive results, wantonly . . .
wreckted] a number of local public school systems and outrag[edl the communities they
serve." Lusky, supra note 44, at 413, 424. To the same effect, see Abraham, supra note 46.
82. Tushnet, supra note 71, at 1323, 1325.
83. Leedes, supra note 15, at 1403.
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strive "to superimpose a facade of rationality."8 4 Consider Bolling v.
Sharpe8 5 in which Chief Justice Warren read the "equal protection
clause" of the fourteenth amendment into the fifth, a decision which
Ely, to whom Warren is a "carefully" chosen "hero,"8 6 says is "gibberish
both syntactically and historically,"87 and which Brest agrees "is not
supported by even a generous reading of the fifth amendment., 88
Warren's reasoning is a prize exhibit of the judicial genius for
"'articulation" of reasons that justify decision: "[I]n view of our decision
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government, 8 9
Having reversed the Framers' intention to exclude suffrage from the
fourteenth amendment, symmetry required that the unconstitutional
revision be pushed still further back! It is as if one who crashed through
a hydrant felt constrained to complete the demolition by driving
through a store window.
Nevertheless Bolling passes muster with Brest because he "cannot
think of a plausible argument against this result - other than. . . that
it is not supported by . . . the fifth amendment,"9 ° which should be
reason enough. Respect for the integrity of constitutional decision-
making, for the Constitution itself, is more than "plausible," it goes to
the heart of our democratic system. If the criterion be a "result"
pleasing to a given judge and his admirers, then is the Constitution
indeed irrelevant, and we are returned to the administration of '"justice"
in a given case after the manner of a Kadi sitting under a tree.9 1 Once
84. Tushnet, supra note 71, at 1325.
85. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
86. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, Dedication
(1980).
87. Id. at 32.
88. Brest, supra note 1, at 233.
89. 347 U.S. at 500.
90. Brest, supra note 1, at 233.
91. Such reasoning, as Leedes observes, "benignly subverts the political system
contemplated by liberal thought - one that functions by means of determinate rules,
admittedly unjust in particular cases but designed to avoid the constantly recurring need
for equitable decisionmaking by judges and other officials." Leedes, supra note 15, at 1389.
The Founders' "profound fear" of judicial discretion, G. Wool, CREATION OF TIlE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 298 (1969), precludes an easy inference that such
discretion was delegated. See comments of Chief Justice Hutchinson, supra note 47.
Professor Harry W. Jones also adverts words to "the prevailing distrust of judicial
discretion." Jones, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and American
Variations, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAl. CONTINUITY 103 (H. Jones ed. 1976).
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"results" are decisive, articulated reasons are superfluous; indeed the
attempt to rationalize ad hoc decisions has produced a labyrinth.92
When, however, the result is displeasing to Brest, he parts company
with the Court,93 for example, in Richardson v. Ramirez,94 wherein the
Court refused to extend the equal protection doctrine to prohibit the
disfranchisement of ex-felons. The Court concluded that "those who
framed and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment could not have
intended to prohibit outright in section 1 of that Amendment that which
was expressly exempted from the lesser sanction of reduced representa-
tion imposed by section 2 of the Amendment."95 Now the Framers
categorically stated that this "reduced representation" provision of
section 2 demonstrated that suffrage was excluded from section 1,96 an
assurance essential to passage of the amendment, so that on the Court's
own reasoning the "one person-one vote" doctrine is indefensible. In
Ramirez the Court elevated the presumed intent above the clearly
demonstrable actual intent because it preferred the Ramirez result. For
Brest,
[The Court's analysis seems] correct but beside the point. The
adopters would probably have disapproved of all the court's modern
voting rights decisions .... But the moral and political principles
on which the modern decisions depend apply with equal force to
convicted felons. To adhere to the general doctrine but not require
the state to justify its discrimination is arbitrary and
unprincipled. 97
92. See text accompanying notes 82-84 supra. In Anatole France's delightful satire
on the Dreyfus case - wherein the French Army, trapped in false charges on which it
condemned Captain Dreyfus to Devil's Island, piled forgery upon forgery to thwart
reversal - the Minister of War calls upon the Chief of Staff and is startled to see files of
"evidence" stacked to the ceiling. Told that these were proofs of Dreyfus' guilt, the
Minister remarked, "Proofs! Of course it is good to have proofs, but perhaps it is better to
have none at all." Originally, he continued, the case "was invulnerable because it was
invisible. Now it gives an enormous handle for discussion." A. FRANCE, PENGUIN ISLAND
194 (N.Y. 1933).
93. Other activists also make their own moral judgments the test. See Lusky, supra
note 81; and Abraham, supra note 46.
94. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
95. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
96. For example, John Bingham, draftsman of the fourteenth amendment, states
"The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of
regulating suffrage in the several states." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
Senator Jacob Howard, who explained the amendment to the Senate, said, "Itihe second
section leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States, and does
not meddle with that right." Id. at 2766. For additional citations, see R. BERGER supra note
29, at 64-68.
97. Brest, supra note 1, at 233-34.
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Thus Brest shifts gears from "results" to "principles." Why are the
Court's own "principles" more "binding" than those of the Framers? If it
be on the ground of "values" or "morals," Brest can hardly substitute his
own for those of the Court after maintaining its special "competence" to
ascertain fundamental values. 98 He would make his morals the test of
constitutionality when it is the Court that is allegedly keeper of the
"national conscience." 99
In truth, to borrow from Sandalow, the legislature is a better
instrument of change than the courts, because the lawmakers "are
amenable to popular control through ordinary political processes," a
vital need if law is to respond "to the interests and values of the
citizenry."' 0 0 Moreover, "the active and continuous participation of the
governed in their government, either directly or by representation...
has been understood to be central to the democratic ideal."' 0' As
Professor Gary Leedes remarks, "[w]e should be skeptical of any model
that proposes to replace our system of representative democracy with
rule by a benevolent and omniscient judicial aristocracy,"' 0 2 the




Brest is driven to denounce the binding effect of the Constitution by
his concern for minority rights:'0 4 the "interests of black Americans
were not adequately represented in the adoption of the Constitution of
1787 or the fourteenth amendment." The "fact that a provision was
drafted by an unrepresentative and self-interested portion of the
adoptors' society weakens its claim on a different society one or two
hundred years later."'0 5 Good enough, let Brest's generation change the
98. Id. at 227.
99. Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U.
CI. L. REV. 661, 689 (1960).
100. Sandalow, supra note 42, at 1166.
101. Id. at 1178. Ely also stresses the anti-democrotarian nature of the Court's role.
Ely, supra note 42, at 404-05, 408-09, 411. He concludes that "laln untrammeled
majority is indeed a dangerous thing, but it will require a heroic inference to get from that
realization to the conclusion that enforcement by unelected officials of an 'unwritten
constitution' is an appropriate response in a democratic republic." Id. at 411. He finds that
"heroic inference" in an alleged "invitation" issued by the Framers to incorporate
extra-constitutional values. See Berger, supra note 41.
102. Leedes, supra note 15, at 1436.
103. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 73 (1962); for Gerry, see text accompanying note 125
infra.
104. Some commentators "approach vindication of a minority as the fundamental
principle of constitutional law." Bridwell, supra note 66, at 38 n.89.
105. Brest, supra note 1, at 230.
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provision according to article V. But one of his fellow activists, Sanford
Levinson, whom he cites, urged that "those who feel tyrannized by the
existing legal order [need not] recognize it as legitimate."' 0'6 In that case
they are poorly positioned to invoke the Constitution against the
majority. 10 7
Originally it was premised that the rights of minorities "protected
by the Courts were established in the Constitution."'1 8 Brest acknow-
ledges that "[m]any of what we have come to regard as the irreducible
minima of rights are actually supra-constitutional; almost none of the
others are entailed by the text or original understanding.' 1 9 More
baldly, most minority "rights" are judge-made, without roots in the
Constitution. Yet the Court, holding that there is no constitutional
"right to education," stated: "It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws."' 0 Given that we are not bound by the
Constitution, nor by the same logic by its creatures, judges, what
compels the majority to go beyond what it is ready to confer?
Since minority "rights" supply the motive power for academe's
rejection of constitutional limitations, their scope is worth developing.
One cannot speak of minority "rights" en gros; Gouverneur Morris,
defender of propertied minority, said in the Convention, "within the
State itself a majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief done
106. Id. at 234 n.116; Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER'S, May 1,
1977, 35, 40.
107. See note 5 supra. Brest recognizes that "[tihe Constitution reflects pragmatic and
not always principled compromise among a variety of regional, economic, and political
interests," but considers that "there is no justification for binding the present to the
compromises of another age." Brest, supra note 1, at 229. "Compromises" are a part of the
political, not the judicial, process and if they are to be displaced ini favor of new
"compromises," for such is the nature of our polity, it should be by resort to the people and
their representatives, the more since according to Brest the people remain attached to the
Constitution.
108. Sandalow, supra note 42, at 1173. It "is important to note," Bridwell observes,
"that the protection of minorities permitted or required by the Constitution is itself a
product of majority decisions, and not simply some overriding 'just' principle that the
judiciary is charged with enforcing, without regard to whatever else the Constitution
might say." Bridwell, supra note 68, at 638 n.89.
109. Brest, supra note 1, at 236. "[Wle are repeatedly told by the courts that the
current egalitarianism which they are helping to impose derives from the American
Constitution. That, I think, is arrant nonsense. It is not being taken from the
Constitution, it is being put into it." Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality,
1979 B.Y.U. REV. 1, 8. Professor Robert G. McCloskey stated that "during the past 30
years, the Court has built a whole body of Constitutional jurisprudence in this field
broadly called civil liberties almost out of whole cloth. It has been making new laws
... ."Hearings, supra note 32, at 98.
110. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
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among themselves.""' The 1787 Constitution largely defined a struc-
ture of government, delineating its powers; such individual rights as
were granted dealt with security of property, commerce and contracts.
Broader individual rights are first enumerated in the Bill of Rights,
applicable to all of the people, not any particular minority, in great part.
designed to secure established criminal procedures in prosecutions 112 by
a remote and suspect federal government. Certainly the Constitution
did not create a "roving judicial commission to protect minorities
against majorities in all cases."' 13
Elsewhere I have shown that the fourteenth amendment did not
create a charter of unlimited minority rights." 4 Brest now concedes
that the "adopters of the equal protection clause probably intended it
not to encompass voting discrimination at all.""' 5 A number of activist
commentators agree that the Framers equally excluded segregation
from its scope. 1 6 Brest is still unwilling to admit that the amendment
merely incorporated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which prohibited
discrimination only with respect to the imposition of punishments and
the rights to own property, enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and
testify in court. This Brest calls a "narrow reading"' 1 7 but it faithfully
mirrors the express terms of the Act, and is confirmed by the legislative
history. And in 1870, Justice Bradley held that "the civil rights bill was
enacted at the same session, and but shortly before the presentation of the
fourteenth amendment. . . [it] was in pari materia; and was probably
111. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 439. James Wilson stated: "The majority ...
would be no more governed by interest than the minority. It was surely better to let the
latter be bound hand and foot than the former." Id. at 451. "[R]ule in accord with the
consent of a majority of those governed is the core of the American governmental system."
Ely, supra note 42, at 411.
112. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1972).
113. Bridwell, The Federal Judiciary: America's Recently Liberated Minority, 30 S.
CAR. L. REV. 467, 475 (1979). Nor did they disable themselves "from taking a position
contrary to any minority interest." Id. at 476.
114. R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 20-68, 117-31, 166-214.
115. Brest, supra note 1, at 115.
116. Professor Nathaniel Nathanson concluded that the view that the fourteenth
amendment "would not require school desegregation ... was quite conclusively
demonstrated by Alexander Bickel .. " Nathanson, Constitutional Interpretation and the
Democratic Process, 56 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580-81 (1978). Abraham considers that "[any
genuinely objective, factual and rigorous examination of the debates and history of the
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that the authors and supporters of
that provision specifically rejected its application to segregated schools and the franchise."
Abraham, supra note 44, at 467. See also Bridwell, supra note 113, at 913-14 n.32; Perry,
supra note 63, at 696.
117. Brest, supra note 1, at 230.
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intended to reach the same object. . . the first section of the bill covers the
same ground as the fourteenth amendment . . ,1 .
What Bradley thought "probable" was in fact the uncontroverted view of
the Framers that Act and amendment were "identical.""' 9 So much for
history.
Observing that "'Democracy' means government by the people,
either directly or through representation," Sandalow asks, "why, in a
nation generally committed to democratic values, a minority should
have a special claim to promote its interests outside the political
process."'2° Madison considered that the diverse interest of parties and
interests would guard against the "tyranny of the majority.' 121 Justice
Stone cautioned against the "tyranny of the minority,"' 22 and Bridwell
justly asks, "what makes the tyranny of the minority - the judiciary or
those they favor - better than the tyranny of the majority?"'123
Certainly the Founders did not contemplate that the tail might wag the
dog; for them "individual rights, even the basic civil liberties that we
consider so crucial, possessed little of their modern theoretical relevance
when set against the will of the people."' 124 Like Elbridge Gerry, they
118. Livestock Dealers & Butchers Assn. v. Crescent City Livestock & Slaughter
House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (1870) (No. 8, 408). The four dissenters in the Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872), led by Justice Field, replied to the question,
"Wihat then are the privileges and immunities which are secured against abridgment by
State legislation?" "In the first section of the Civil Rights Act [of 18661 Congress has given
its interpretation to these terms [which] . . . include the right 'to make and enforce
contracts [etc.]"
119. For citations, see R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 23, 43.
120. Sandalow, supra note 42, at 1163.
121. THE FEDERALIST, No. 10 at 61 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937); see also id. No. 51 at 339. An
activist, Dean Carl Auerbach, wrote, "the 'monolithic' majority .. .does not exist; the
majority is but a coalition of minorities which must act in a moderate, broadly
representative fashion to preserve itself." Quoted in Sandalow, supra note 42, at 1191.
Sandalow also quotes the philosopher Sidney Hook's view that "the dictatorship of the
majority [is a] bugaboo which haunts the books of political theorists but has never been
found in the flesh in modern history." Id.
122. "The experience of the past one hundred and fifty years has revealed the danger
that, through judicial interpretation, the constitutional device for the protection of
minorities from oppressive majority action, may be made the means by which the majority
is subjected to tyranny of the minority." A.T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE
LAW 331 (1956).
123. Bridwell, supra note 68, at 654. "Minority tyranny occurs if the majority is
prevented from ruling where its power is legitimate." Bork, supra note 35, at 3; see note
111 supra.
124. G. WOOD, supra note 91, at 63. He adds, "it was conceivable to protect the common




relied "on the Representatives of the people [not the courts] as the
guardians of their Rights and Interests."'
125
Was Activist Power Conferred?
Academics discuss judicial activism largely in empirical terms,
neglecting the core issue: did the Constitution confer "untethered"
discretion 126 on the courts. Some argue that the Framers issued an
"invitation" to judges to revise the Constitution, 127 or that they made
judges their "surrogate" for the purpose of keeping the Constitution up
to date. 128 Or they assume that "we" have "entrusted to them the task
of framing a new ideology" to which the people are to conform, suavely
postulating that their own cloistered views represent those of the
citizenry' 29 who, of course, have not been consulted. Brest falls into no
such snares; he argues that judicial activism is justified by the special
"competence" of judges of which inescapably they themselves are to be
the judge. Expertise does not create power.
Very different was the original design. Brest notes that the bulk of
the Constitution "is constitutive - establishing and marking the
boundaries of government entities,"'130 or as Marshall said, limiting and
defining the several powers.' 31 Of the three departments, Hamilton
assured the Ratifiers, the judiciary "is next to nothing," and he left no
doubt as to the limited scope of judicial power.' 3 2 That had been
125. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 97-98.
126. The word is Ely's, supra note 42, at 403; see also note 47 supra.
127. "Vague and uncertain laws, and more especially Constitutions, are the very
instruments of Slavery." SAMUEL ADAMS, WRITINGS 262 (H. Cushing ed. 1904). An ardent
activist, Professor Charles L. Black, noted the colonists' conception that "[liaw is a body of
existing and determinate rules," which "is to be ascertained" by the judges by consulting
"statutes, precedents and the rest," and that "the function of the judge was thus placed in
sharpest antithesis to that of the legislator," who alone was concerned "with what the law
ought to be." C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 160 (1960).
128. Lusky, supra note 44, at 21. Justice Black, the quondam darling of egalitarians,
dismissed "rhapsodical strains, about the duty of the Court to keep the Constitution in
tune with the times. . . . The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided
for it." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
129. See note 75 supra.
130. Brest, supra note 1, at 237 n.124.
131. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
132. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 at 504 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). For example, there "is no
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers," id.; the courts may not "on the pretense of a repugnancy . . . substitute their
own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature," id. at 507; "[tlo avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents..." id. at 510. And he assured the Ratifiers in No. 81, id. at
526-27, that judges could be impeached for "deliberate usurpations on the authority of the
legislature."
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articulated by Montesquieu, the oracle of the Founders: "The national
judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the
law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or
vigour."'133 Responding to the views of Elbridge Gerry and others that
judges were not especially qualified to judge policy, the Framers
excluded them from participation in the legislative process.' 34 Justice
Iredell, one of the foremost proponents of judicial review, reiterated that
within their constitutional boundaries, legislatures were not controll-
able by judges.' 35
Activists like Professor Stanley Kutler argue, however, that
"[j]udicial policymaking fills a vacuum created when politically account-
able legislators . . . abdicate their proper policy role."' 136 But the
Supreme Court held "it is a breach of the national fundamental law if
Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to . . . the
judicial branch.' '137 Discretion when to exercise a power is vested in the
133. 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 206, Book XI, ch. 6 (4th ed. 1768, printed
by A. Donaldson).
134. For discussion see R. BERGER, supra note 29 at 300-03.
135. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 199, 266 (1796). In one of the landmark cases to
assert the power of judicial review, Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 47 (1973),
Judge Henry declared:
The judiciary, from the nature of the office . . . could never be designed to determine
upon the equity, necessity, or usefulness of a law; that would amount to an express
interfering with the legislative branch. . . . [Not being chosen immediately by the
people, nor being accountable to them .. .they do not, and ought not, to represent
the people in framing or repealing any law."
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Field held, "[wihen once it is established
that Congress possesses the power to pass an act, our province ends with its construc-
tion.. . . [T]he province of the courts is to pass upon the validity of laws, not to make them
. .."The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,603 (1889). Jucicial review, Judge Learned
Hand wrote, "should be confined to occasions when the statute ororder was outside the grant of
power to the grantee, and should not include a review of how the power has been exercised." L.
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 66 (1962).
136. Kutler, supra note 22, at 523.
137. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976). A constitutional power may not be
"abdicated". United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 (1950).
Professor Gerald Gunther rejected "the view that courts are authorized to step in
when injustices exist and other institutions fail to act. That is a dangerous - and I think
illegitimate - prescription for judicial action." Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial
Role: Distinctions, Routes and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 817, 825.
In the First Congress, Madison particularized that the design of the separation of
powers was that the "Judicial lbranch] shall [never] exercise the powers vested in the
Legislative or Executive Departments." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435-36 (Gales & Seaton ed.
1836, print bearing running title "History of Congress".) One of the Framers, Charles
Pinckney, said in the House of Representatives in 1798, that they intended that "the
powers of Government should be distributed among the different departments, and that
they ought not to be assigned or relinquished." 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 376.
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branch to whom the power is confided.' 3I All the greater is the breach
when courts take over legislative power because the legislature or the
people have failed to exercise it.
Power to Amend
Brest grapples with the "central problem" posed for his position by
the fact that the Constitution furnishes the machinery for change; he
recognizes that "the amending power . . . is a vital element in the
constitutional scheme." But he argues that "the absence of an amend-
ment [cannot] be taken as popular consent to the Constitution,"' 39
rephrasing his call for recurrent consent to the Constitution. Of course,
if the absence of such "consent" deprives the Constitution of binding
force, the amendment provision dies with it. But if it remains alive,
where does he derive power to set aside the exclusive provision for
amendment by the people pursuant to article V? To dispose of article V,
Brest first argues that "the formal process of amendment is too
cumbersome,"'" an argument not the less amazing because so oft
repeated:141 compliance with the law is excused if it is "too cumber-
some." By such logic a burglar may justify that he broke in through a
window because the door was locked. Brest observes that "to hold that a
purpose of our Constitution is to protect individual rights . . . is to
concede that there will be times when no majority, let alone a
super-majority [three-fourths of the States] will adequately protect
these rights.' 142 So far as "rights" are embodied in the Constitution,
judicial "protection" is authorized. But Brest would set article V aside so
that judges may provide protection for new rights that have no
constitutional sanction and cannot win the "consent" of the people. 143 A
138. See note 135 supra; Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840);
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 169-70 (1803).
139. Brest, supra note 1, at 236.
140. Id. (emphasis added). Justices Douglas and Black declared that "Itihe temptation
of many men of good will is to cut corners, take short cuts, and reach the desired end
regardless of the means." Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 494 (1960).
141. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional Executive or Presidential Agree-
ments: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 184, 293 (1945):
because "the process of amendment is politically difficult, other modes of change have
emerged." (Emphasis added). Insisting on rigorous compliance with the mechanics of
article V, the Supreme Court held, "it is not the function of the courts or [legislatures]...
to alter the method which the Constitution has fixed." Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227
(120).
142. Brest, supra note 1, at 237.
143. See text accompanying note 109 supra. Professor Joseph W. Bishop stated: "Those
who favor abortion, busing . . . and who oppose capital punishment . . . obviously have
no faith whatever in the wisdom of the will of the great majority of the people, who are
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corollary to Brest's argument is that if "adjudication is to perform the
functions" he assigns to it, "its growth must proceed more incremen-
tally," as "in fact [it] has.' 14 4 In other words, courts must perforce amend
the Constitution if they are to perform their unconstitutional function, and
they have done so, the apotheosis of boot-strapping. On the other-hand,
Chief Justice Marshall, the putative father of judicial review, disclaimed
power "to change that instrument.'
145
So far as the Constitution still remains alive and well, the
applicable gloss was furnished by Hamilton in Federalist No. 78:
Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act,
annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon
themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presump-
tion, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their
representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act. 146
Mark that Hamilton left no room for judicial diviners. The "solemn and
authoritative act" to which he referred is amendment through the
machinery of article V, the sole constitutional mechanism for change.
For this exclusivity we need go no further than Washington:
If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of
the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be
corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution
designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for though
this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the
customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. 147
As a clincher, Brest asks, "suppose that tomorrow it were demons-
trated . . .that the adopters intended to limit the [equal protection]
opposed to them. They are doing everything possible to have these problems resolved by a
small minority in the courts and the bureaucracy." Bishop, What is a Liberal - Who is a
Conservative?, 62 COMMENTARY 47 (September, 1976).
144. Brest, supra note 1, at 236.
145. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 209 (G. Gunther ed.
1969).
146. THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 at 509 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
147. 35 G. WASHINGTON, WRITINGS 228-229 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). Justice Story
wrote that if a constitutional restriction "be mischievous, the power of redressing the evil
lies with the people by an exercise of the power of amendment. If they choose not to apply
the remedy, it may fairly be presumed the mischief is less than what would arise from a
further extension of the power, or that it is the least of two evils." 1 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 426 at 325 (5th ed. 1905).
And he wrote, "a departure from the true import and sense of its powers is pro tanto the
establishment of a new constitution. It is doing for the people what they have not chosen
to do for themselves. Id.
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clause to a narrow range of racially discriminatory practices: Would
many decades of moderate originalist doctrine become retroactively
misguided?"'14' Thus Brest attaches to the Warren Court's decisions of
the 1950s and 1960s a binding force that he refuses the 200-year-old
Constitution. 149  But Justices Holmes and Brandeis held that the
100-year-old Swift v. Tyson constituted "an unconstitutional assumption
of power by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or
respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."' 5 °
The Original Intention
Activists strenuously seek to discredit resort to the "original
intention"'151 because it squarely contradicts the Warren Court's
desegregation and reapportionment decisions. Unlike Brest, I did not
undertake a dissertation on the general subject of interpretation, but
singled out one aspect which bears on the scope of the fourteenth
amendment, whereunder the courts have been swamped with
litigation.'5 2 My core thesis, and I refer to it because at a number of
points Brest calls attention to Berger's cloven hoof,1 53 was that the
framers of the amendment unmistakably excluded suffrage from its
scope, a position Brest labels as "moderate originalist"; for such the
ttsources are conclusive when they speak clearly."'5 4 When, however, he
turns to me, he aligns me with the "strict intentionalists," who
"determine how the adopters would have applied a provision to a given
situation. . . ,1" I am no soothsayer; and given the clear exclusion of
suffrage there was no occasion to consider how the Framers "would have
applied" a non-existent provision. That they excluded suffrage Brest
now admits.'5 6 And he recognized that "the nation was not ready to
148. Brest, supra note 1, at 232. This is tantamount to holding that "the Court's claim
to power is fait accompli; it is unrealistic to presume it reversible." Bridwell, supra note
68, at 632.
149. Where Brest is horrified by a challenge to Warren's desegregation decision, see
text accompanying notes 195-97 infra, he frivolously comments that to rely "on originalist
sources," e.g. the Constitution which admittedly is the "civil religion" of the people, "is
rather like having a remote ancestor who came over on the Mayflower." Brest, supra note
1, at 234.
150. Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
151. See Alfange, supra note 63. Arthur S. Miller scornfully dismisses the "intention of
the Framers" as a "filio-pietistic notion." Miller & Howell, supra note 99, at 683. For
critique of Miller, see Bridwell, supra note 68, at 639-41; Berger, Comment on Professor
Miller's Essay, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 576-89 (1979).
152. R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 1.
153. See text accompanying notes 195, 197, 202, 207, 209-10, 213, 217, 221 infra.
154. Brest, supra note 1, at 229 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 231, 222 (emphasis added).
156. See text accompanying notes 203-05 infra.
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eliminate ['school segregation'] in the 1860's.' 5 7 All this is incompati-
ble with his assertion that "strict intentionalism produces a highly
unstable constitutional order. The claims of. . .Raoul Berger demons-
trate that a settled constitutional understanding is in perpetual jeopardy
of being overturned by new light on the adopters' intent .... )1158 It
needed no "new light" to lead the Warren Court to "overturn"
precedents that had been "settled" for 100 years. 5 9 Better the
prevailing false light (one person-one vote), "settled" in 1962, than the
true facts which he himself concedes! Can what he has himself
discovered be dismissed as "questing after a chimera"? 160 Despite the
philosophical generalization "¢we can never understand the past in its
own terms," he fully understands that suffrage was excluded by the
Framers.' 6 ' How fares Brest's "indeterminate and contingent nature of
the historical understanding"1 62 in the face of this "irrefutable" fact?
Traditionally, as Brest notes, the Constitution has been viewed as
"the supreme law of the land. The Constitution manifests the will of the
sovereign citizens of the United States - 'we the people' assembled in
the conventions and legislatures that ratified the Constitution and its
amendments. The interpreter's task is to ascertain their will." This he
calls "originalism" ;16  and it may be added that the canon "[t]he
intention of the lawmaker is the law" goes back six or seven hundred
years.16' Because I bow to that "will" I am an "originalist"; 6 5 and I
shall now examine some of Brest's objections to reliance on the original
intention.
We cannot assume, he maintains, that a constitutional term was
"tused as a term of art" because though the several Conventions
"included many lawyers, the vast majority of participants were
laypersons, and it cannot simply be assumed that they used the phrase
157. Brest, supra note 54. Nevertheless, his final sentehce: "To put it bluntly, one can
better protect fundamental values and the integrity of democratic process by protecting
them than by guessing how other people meant to govern a different society a hundred or
more years ago." Brest, supra note 1, at 238 (emphasis added). The "fundamental values",
i.e. the Framers' exclusion of suffrage and segregation, were removed from "guessing" by
Brest's own admission. Only in Brest's surrealistic world is the reveral of those values
"protecting them."
158. Brest, supra note 1, at 231 (emphasis added).
159. See notes 22 & 23 supra.
160. Brest, supra note 1, at 222.
161. Id. at 221; see text accompanying notes 203 & 205 infra.
162. Id. at 222.
163. Id. at 204.
164. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903).
165. Almost 40 years ago I refused to make my predilections the test of constitutional-
ity. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post Mortem, 9 U. Cm. L. REv. 602 (1942).
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in its technical sense. ' 166 Laymen, however, turn to lawyers for drafting
documents of legal consequence, for example, deeds, conveyances.
Laymen had relied on lawyers for the Declaration of Independence, and
sent them to the several Conventions. Are we to discard the common
law meaning of habeas corpus, bills of attainder, ex post facto, due
process, because laymen preponderated? The Supreme Court's practice
from the beginning has been to the contrary. 167 Brest himself attaches
importance to "term[s] of art that [had] been largely . . . in the control
of an elite professional group. ,168 His doubts were not shared by the
Court:
The statesmen and lawyers of the Convention . . .were born and
brought up in the atmosphere of the common law, and thought and
spoke in its vocabulary . . . . [W]hen they came to put their
conclusions into the form of fundamental law in a compact draft,
they expressed them in terms of the common law, confident that
they could be shortly and easily understood.'
69
Somewhat different problems are posed by terms which had no fixed
meaning, for example, "equal protection." Here we need to ask, what
meaning did the Framers attach to the words.' 7° Brest argues that
166. Brest, supra note 1, at 206 n.11. On the other hand, the Supreme Court, per
Justice Harlan, stated: "[W]e should not assume that Congress . . . used the words
'advocate' and 'teach' in their ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already been
construed as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation." Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957).
167. For citations see Berger, Bills of Attainder: A Study of Amendment by the Court,
63 CORNELL L. REV. 355, 361-64 (1978).
168. Brest, supra note 1, at 208 n.21.
169. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 (1925). To the same effect, Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1978), per Chase, J.: "The expressions 'ex post facto laws' are
technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an
appropriate meaning by Legislators, Lawyers and Authors." As Chief Justice Marshall
wrote of "treason," "it is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the
framers of our Constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom
we borrowed it." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14693).
170. Justice James Wilson, a leading architect of the Constitution wrote that "[tihe
first and governing maxim in the interpretation of a statute is, to discover the meaning of
those, who made it." 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 75 (McCloskey ed. 1967). He was
echoed by Justice Story. 1 J. STORY, supra note 147, at § 400. That view had been
enunciated by Thomas Rutherforth in 1756. For this and other citations, see R. BERGER,
supra note 29, at 366. In our own time, Justice Holmes wrote: "Of course, the purpose of
written instruments is to express some intention or state of mind of those who write them,
and it is desirable to make that purpose [effective]. 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 206 (1920).
To escape the grip of this canon, activists maintain that rules of statutory
construction are inapplicable to interpretation of the Constitution. But Justice Story
commended the sections on statutory interpretation in Matthew Bacon's Abridgment and
Rutherforth. 1 J. STORY, id. at §§ 400, 403 at 305, 307. For citations to similar views by
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"It]he practice of statutory interpretation from the 18th through at least
the mid-19th century suggest that the adopters assumed. . . a mode of
interpretation that was more textualist than intentionalist.' 17' Given
ambiguous provisions, however, English judges from a very early date
looked to contemporaneous constructions, to the mischief to be cured,172
and other extrinsic circumstances, for the meaning of the draftsmen.
True it is they did not look to "legislative debates" for the reason, first,
that such records were very late aborning, and second, because they
were deemed inconclusive. That some records are inconclusive is poor
reason for barring those which are unequivocal. Since the basic
principle is to give effect to the legislative intention, it is "arbitrary and
unprincipled"'173 to reject the best evidence - the legislators' own
unmistakable record. Brest observes, it is "hard to imagine . . . the
Court changing the number of Senators allocated to each State other
than by constitutional amendment.' 74  By what logic should be
unmistakable intention to allocate two Senators to each state be
differentiated because not textually expressed? To the contrary, Justice
Edward Corwin, Julius Goebel, Harry W. Jones, see BERGER, Judge Gibbons Argument Ad
Hominem, 59 B.U.L. REV. 783, 805 (1979).
It is symptomatic of Brest's one-sided version that he should ask, "[w]hat did the
words 'privileges and immunities,' 'due process,' 'equal protection of the laws,' 'citizen,' and
'person' mean to those who adopted them in 1868," citing 1890 and 1926 articles dealing
with the meaning of "liberty" in the fifth and fourteenth amendments, Brest, supra note 1,
at 209, while ignoring the lengthy three chapters I devoted to the very question he asks.
171. Brest, supra note 1, at 215.
172. The roots of contemporaneous construction go deep. In 1454, Chief Justice Prisot
declared, "the judges who gave these decisions in ancient times were nearer to the making
of the statute than we now are, and had more acquaintance with it." Windham v.
Felbridge, Y.B. 33 Hen. VI f.38, 41, pl. 17 (quoted in C. K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 193
(6th ed. 1958)). See also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 290 (1827).
"Under principles coming down to us from Heydon's Case [76 E.R. 638 (1584)], a
court . . . must endeavor to appreciate the mischief the framers were seeking to
alleviate." Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV.
929, 943 (1965).
173. This is how Brest brands the Court's straying from the true path, see text
accompanying note 97 supra.
174. Brest, supra note 1, at 238 n.124. Brest explains his "Senator" example, not on
the basis of an "a priori ... timeless principle" but on the ground that "a presumption of
fidelity to the text and original understanding is very unlikely to be rebutted." Id.
(emphasis added). Of course, the text stands highest when it faithfully reflects the original
understanding. But what if the text is rebutted by the original understanding. A simpler
explanation is that normally men are taken to mean what they say; they do not, however,
use words to defeat their purposes. As Madison wrote, "it exceeds the possibility of belief,
that the known advocates in the Convention for a jealous grant and certain definition of
federal powers, should have silently permitted the introduction of words or phrases in a
sense rendering fruitless the restrictions and definitions elaborated by them." 3 M.
FARRAND, supra note 3, at 488. Having clearly excluded suffrage, the Framers did not
mean to nullify that intention by the words "equal protection", as Brest now admits. See
text accompanying note 203 infra.
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Holmes held that when a legislature "has intimated its will, however
indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. . . . [I]t is not an
adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: 'We see what you are
driving at, but you have not said it . . 175
Whatever the practice at "mid-nineteenth century," we have some
facts respecting "the canons by which the adopters intended their
provisions to be interpreted"'176 which make resort to that practice
redundant. In the midst of the session that was framing the fourteenth
amendment, Senator Charles Sumner, well aware that the great
majority of the Senate opposed his extreme abolitionist views, yet stated
that if the meaning of the Constitution "in any place is open to doubt, or
if words are used which seem to have no fixed signification [e.g., equal
protection], we cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority
increases in proportion to the evidence which they have left on the
question., 177 This was confirmed by confreres who also sat in the 39th
Congress.1 78 And such views were summarized in 1872 by a "unanimous
Senate Judiciary Committee report, signed by Senators who had voted
for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in
Congress," 179 the subject being the fourteenth amendment:
A construction which should give the phrase . . . a meaning
differing from the sense in which it was understood and employed
by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as
unconstitutional as a departure from the plain and express
language of the Constitution in any other particular. This is the
rule of interpretation adopted by all commentators on the Constitu-
tion, and in all judicial expositions of that instrument.1 80
Here we have the best sort of "contemporaneous construction" of the
interpretive canon by which the "adopters intended their provisions to
be interpreted."
175. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) (quoted in Keifer & Keifer
v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 391 n.4 (1939)).
176. Brest, supra note 1, at 215; Brest states that the first task of an intentionalist is
to determine what those canons are. Id.
177. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866).
178. John Farnsworth of Illinois, who participated in the 1866 debates, said of the
fourteenth amendment: "Let us see what was understood to be its meaning at the time of
its adoption by Congress." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 115 (1871). James
Garfield, another participant, rejected an interpretation of the amendment that went
"beyond the intent of those who framed and those who amended the Constitution." Id. at
app. 152. For additional citations, see Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the
Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 311, 358 n.283 (1979).
179. A. AviNs, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS DEBATES ii (1967).
180. S. REP. No. 21, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1872), reprinted in A. AVINS, supra note 179,
at 571-72.
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"[Flew if any intentionalist interpreters," Brest argues, "actually
attempt to count the intention-votes of the adopters of statutory and
constitutional provisions. '"181 Weigh this against the facts regarding
suffrage, of which I shall set out the barest skeleton. Justice Brennan
observed that "17 of 19" northern states had rejected black suffrage
between 1865-1868."82 Consequently, Roscoe Conkling, a member of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction of both Houses, which drafted the
fourteenth amendment, stated it would be "futile to ask three quarters
of the States to do. . .the very thing which most of them have already
refused to do . . .."1,3 Another member of the Committee, Senator
Jacob Howard, who explained the amendment to the Senate, said that
"three-fourths of the States. . .could not be induced to grant the right
of suffrage, even in any degree or under any restriction to the colored
race."18 4 The chairman of the Joint Committee, Senator William
Fessenden, said of a suffrage proposal that there is not "the slightest
possibility that it will be adopted by the States."1 5 The debates are
stuffed with similar utterances.' The Report of the Joint Committee
confirmed that the States would not surrender "a power they had
always exercised, and to which they were attached," and therefore it
was concluded to "leave the whole question with the people of each
State."'8 7 Courts regard statements by the Committee, its chairman and
members as convincing evidence of legislative intent.18 8 These state-
ments are confirmed by a remarkable fact. During the pendency of
ratification, radical opposition to readmission of Tennessee because its
constitution excluded Negro suffrage was voted down in the House by
125 to 12.189 A similar proposal by Senator Sumner was rejected 34 to
4.19° Such a "count" should satisfy even Brest. More importantly, it
reflected the will of the people: "Negro voting in the North," Professor
William Gillette wrote, "was out of the question. '"191
181. Brest, supra note 1, at 213.
182. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 255-56 (1970).
183. CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866).
184. Id. at 2766.
185. Id. at 704.
186. See R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 30-31, 58-74.
187. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
(undated) xiii (1866).
188. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942); Union Starch &
Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 1951).
189. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3980 (1866).
190. Id. at 4000. Sumner's proposal "that all persons were 'equal before the law,
whether in the courtroom or at the ballot box' received 8 yeas to 39 nays." 6 C. FA1iRMAN,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1264 (1972).
191. W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF TIE FIFTEEN'rII




Scholars command respect because they are thought to be disin-
terested, to stand above the battle. "My colleagues," said Thomas
Huxley at the height of the establishment's campaign to discredit
Darwin's "monkey" theory, "have learned to respect nothing but
evidence, and to believe that their highest duty lies in submitting to it,
however it may jar against their inclinations.' ' 192 Instead, Brest bends
facts to fit his preconceptions; and in his zeal for minority "rights"
disparages those who insist that benign purposes do not confer
constitutional power. He cannot conceive that a disinterested commit-
ment to the integrity of the Constitution and the judicial process stand
no lower than his attachment to extra-constitutional social reform. No
one would gather from his pages that there is a legitimate challenge to
what Professor Philip Kurland termed "the usurpation by the judiciary
of general governmental powers on the pretext that its authority derives
from the Fourteenth Amendment,' ' 193 a take-over that Brest would
justify on the ground that the judges are especially "competent" to
ascertain "fundamental values." Because his deeply-etched bias vitiates
his scholarly credibility, it merits discussion.
In considerable part, his article seeks to escape from my central
thesis: the Court is not empowered to reverse the unmistakable
intention of the Framers. The vast bulk of my historical documentation
was devoted to the exclusion of suffrage from the fourteenth amend-
ment. By way of cumulative evidence, I devoted a slender chapter to the
similar exclusion of segregation. Brest acknowledged that "the nation
was not ready to eliminate [school segregation] in the 1860's.' 94
Nevertheless he entitled his influential New York Times review
"Berger v. Brown, et al", explaining that "excluding apologists for
racism, Berger is almost alone in arguing that the Court erred in Brown
v. Board of Education - the 1954 case that struck down laws forbidding
black and white children to attend the same schools."' 95 "Excluding
apologists for racism" is a nice touch, worthy of Senator McCarthy's
the fourteenth amendment was debated, "made clear the popular hostility to black
suffrage in the North." M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 81 (1977).
192. T. HUXLEY, MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE (1863) (quoted in H. SMITH, MAN AND His
GODS 372 (1953)). Activists forget that "disinterested curiosity is the life-blood of real
civilization." G. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY 10 (1942).
193. Letter to Harvard University Press, August 15, 1977.
194. Brest, supra note 54.
195. Id.
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"guilt by association."' 9 6 Doctrinal purity is not satisfied by mere
refutation - the dissident must be put beyond the pale.
Since, however, the lion's share of my discussion was devoted to
suffrage, that should be the litmus test of my reliability. Brest did not
directly mention suffrage in his review, but maintained that Berger's
"presentation of the data" was "persistently distorted to support his
thesis." He charged me with a "simplistic and myopic argument," with
"some fancy footwork against the text and historical understanding,"
instancing the Court's reliance for its "race discrimination cases" on the
"equal protection clause.' 7 Why Brest should make me his whipping
boy, when I merely confirmed the conclusion of his "beloved mentor,"
Justice John Marshal Harlan, 9 ' passes all understanding. Harlan
reminded the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut that the reapportion-
ment decisions were "made in the face of irrefutable and still
unanswered history to the contrary,"' 9 9 mustered by him in Reynolds v.
Sims.20 0 Half a dozen activist commentators agree.2 ' Where Brest
earlier relied on the "sweeping language" of the "equal protection
clause," and flailed me with "our legal commitment to racial
equality, 20 2 he now admits that "the adopters of the equal protection
clause probably intended it not to encompass voting discrimination at
all, 20 3 still less school segregation. 20 4 And he now concedes that "[t]he
196. Edmund Wilson called this "the bed-fellow line of argument, which relies on
producing the illusion of having put you irremediably in the wrong by associating you
with some odious person who holds a similar opinion." E. WILSON, EUROPE WITHOUT A
BAEDEKER 154 (1966).
197. Brest, supra note 54, at 11, 44.
198. So his case book is dedicated, see note 20 supra.
199. 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965).
200. 377 U.S. 533, 595-608 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 154-67 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For my tribute to these dissents, see
R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 54.
201. Nathanson, Constitutional Interpretation of the Democratic Process, 56 TEX. L.
REV. 579, 581 (1978); Lusky, "Government by Judiciary": What Price Legitimacy?, 6
Hastings Const. L.Q. 403, 406 (1979); Abraham, supra note 44, at 468; Mendelson, Raoul
Berger's Fourteenth Amendment - Abuse by Contraction v. Abuse by Expansion, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 437, 452, 453 (1979); Alfange, supra note 63, at 622; Perry, supra
note 63, at 687.
202. Brest, supra note 54.
203. Brest, supra note 1, at 234 n.115. But he remains unhappy about the equal
protection clause, for he obliquely deplores any argument "that almost every twentieth
century equal protection clause decision is inconsistent with the original understanding of
the fourteenth amendment .. " Id. at 232 n.108. Consider too Brest's concession that
"because of its indeterminacy, the [equal protection] clause does not offer much guidance
even in resolving particular issues of discrimination based on race", id. at 232, a veritable
dream of"untethered" discretion. Leedes, supra note 15, at 1420, states "no one knows yet




adopters would probably have disapproved of all of the Court's modern
voting rights decisions .. ,"205 Its intervention in state criminal
administration is no less questionable, for it must always be remem-
bered that the tenth amendment raises a presumption that no more is
surrendered than is expressed or necessarily implied.2 °6 Yet Brest has
the gall to summon for his "sense of the elusiveness of the original
understanding" Berger's "controversial" argument "that almost . . . all
the Supreme Court's decisions under the fourteenth amendment are
incorrect, '20 7 echoing his earlier demagogic invocation of Brown. Worse,
though the Framers' admitted exclusion of suffrage and segregation
stared him in the face, he transmuted the "equal protection clause" into
the embodiment of "an ideal - of racial equality, '20 8 twisting the facts
to his own preconceptions.
His manner of evaluating the "controversy" again exhibits his
inveterate one-sidedness: he cites unfavorable reviews by Stanley
Kutler, Walter Murphy and Aviam Soifer, with a "But see" to Michael
Perry.20 9 Undeniably Brest's activist brethren shared his horror of a
challenge to the desegregation and reapportionment decisions, though it
is a canon of scientific inquiry that no opinion is sacrosanct, no doctrine
is shielded from reexamination. But Brest, who upbraided me for
allegedly collecting "quotations more or less favoring [my] view, 2 10
employs a double standard in ignoring my painstaking refutation of his
204. Bickel wrote to Justice Frankfurter:
It was preposterous to worry about unsegregated schools, for example, when hardly a
beginning had been made at educating Negroes at all and when obviously special
efforts, suitable only for Negroes would have to be made. . . . It is impossible to
conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible
also to conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the legislation they were
adopting."
Quoted in R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 654 (1976). See also R. BERGER, supra note 29, at
117-33.
Opposition to desegregation was even more intense than to suffrage. Sumner
could not get school desegregation into the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which provided for
equal accommodation in inns, theaters and public conveyances. Berger, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 311, 328-29 (1979).
205. Brest, supra note 1, at 234.
206. "The government . . . can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the
constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly given, or
given by necessary implication." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326
(1816). Brest observes that "a supra-constitutional expansion of Congress' power under
article I would be contra-constitutional under the tenth amendment," Brest, supra note 1,
at 235, and by the same token under the fourteenth.
207. Brest, supra note 1, at 219.
208. Brest, supra note 54.
209. Brest, supra note 1, at 219 n.55.
210. Brest, supra note 54, at 44.
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activist fellows." 1 ' Nor is Perry alone in perceiving that I have raised
questions that call for serious reconsideration of activist assumptions. 212
Compare, too, Brest's charge that "in lieu of reasoned argument" Berger
is guilty of "brief parodies of opposing theories, 2 13 with my forty-two
page analysis of Van Alstyne's critique of Justice Harlan, with my
seventeen-page analysis of Bickel's "open-ended" theory, which another
activist considers I "devastated., 2 14 If we may judge by his own article,
Brest himself no longer places his trust in the "most broadly worded
guarantees" 2 15 of the amendment; in particular, he concedes with
respect to the "open-ended" text of the "equal protection" clause that the
Framers' "resolution was probably contrary to the Court's."21 6 Thus my
211. See Berger, Comment on Professor Stanley I. Kutler's Essay, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.
Q. 590 (1979); Berger, The Scope of Judicial Review and Walter Murphy, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
341. For my comments on Soifer, see Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S. CAR. L.
REV. 427 (1981).
To the activist it is not important whether criticism is well founded; it suffices
that it is aimed at Berger. So, though Brest's recognition that the framers excluded
suffrage and segregation from the fourteenth amendment is at war with Soifer's allout 55
page attack on my historical competence, Soifer is nonetheless cited as an authority.
Similarly, Brest cites Professor William Van Alystyne's critique of Justice
Harlan's demonstration that suffrage was excluded but ignores my detailed examination
of Van Alystyne's analysis, hardly a tribute to a "beloved mentor." R. BERGER, supra note
29, at 69-84, 419-27. Van Alstyne himself, however, commends an author who is "often
at pains to give the strongest arguments on both sides . Van Alstyne, Book Review,
57 Tex. L. Rev. 1489, 1492 (1979) (emphasis added).
212. "Berger effectively destroys whatever might have remained of the notion that
modern constitutional cases involving legislative reapportionment, school desegregation,
criminal procedure, or first amendment issues are somehow rooted (however tenuously) in
the original understanding . . . of the fourteenth amendment." Perry, supra note 63, at
688. Although Professor John Burleigh disagrees with my view of the Court's role, he
stated that my book "not only raises all the right questions, but it is also carefully
documented and rigorously argued, at once learned, illuminating, and challenging."
Burleigh, The Supreme Court and the Constitution, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 151, 152-53
(Special Winter Supplement, 1978).
"Berger's uncomfortable and unfashionable analysis is an important one. It will
not do, as some have already done, to brush it aside in a peremptory manner." Monaghan,
The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C. R. - C. L. REV. 117, 124 (1978). "Berger's
careful scouring of the record and his incisive critique of what he regards as misuse of that
record by others seriously undermines the conventional wisdom concerning the intent of
the Fourteenth." Kommers, Role of the Supreme Court, 40 REV. OF POL. 409, 413 (1978).
There are other similar expressions which contradict Brest's ill-considered charge that
Berger "distorted" the record. On the key issues of segregation and suffrage he is now in
accord.
213. Brest, supra note 54, at 44, col. 3.
214. R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 69-84, 419-27, 117-33.
215. Brest, supra note 54, at 44, col. 1.
216. Brest, supra note 1, at 231. He hedges disingenuously: "if the adopters had any
intention at all" respecting "discrimination in the political process," notwithstanding he
concedes that suffrage was outside the Framers' contemplation. Id.
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documentation has gradually infiltrated his thinking, but he has not the
grace to confess error, even though on his theory that the Constitution
is not binding that error is immaterial.
Candor also required him to notice, in rejecting "Berger's major
premise, that constitutional interpretation should depend chiefly on the
intent of those who framed and adopted a provision," 217 that his
"beloved mentor," Justice Harlan, held that "[w]hen the Court disre-
gards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has
invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power
was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it
is its highest duty to protect., 218 My point is not that this should be
conclusive, but rather that I am not to be besmirched for agreeing with
Justice Harlan.
A final example of Brest's distorted vision. I had written:
It would. . . be utterly unrealistic and probably impossible to undo
the past in the face of the expectations that the segregation
decisions, for example, have aroused in our black citizenry ....
That is more than the courts should undertake and more, I believe,
than the American people would desire. But to accept thus far
accomplished ends is not to condone the continued employment of
the unlawful means . . . . [T]he difficulty of a rollback cannot
excuse the continuation of such unconstitutional practices ... 219
Brest regards this as an expression of regret
that the erroneous doctrine ever came into existence . . . as a
burden that must be borne because of the . . . infidelities of
her 12201 [my] predecessors. Even if she acknowledges the doctrine,
she must not encourage its growth or even strive officially [?] to
sustain it. The originalist program of dealing with an illegitimate
doctrine is one of minimum maintenance and, if possible, gradual
death.2 21
217. Brest, supra note 54, at 44, col. 1.
218. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
219. Brest, supra note 1, at 232 n.108 (quoting R. BERGER, supra note 29, at 412-413.).
220. It is an index of Brest's doctrinaire commitment to reverse discrimination that, in
the face of a tradition spanning several millenia of referring to interpreters as "he," Brest
should replace the masculine by "she." He might at least have given men equal billing:
he/she.
221. Brest, supra note 1, at note 108.
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Manifestly this twists my words: I did not suggest that the "burden"
must "be borne because of the infidelities of her precedessors," but
concluded rather that events, like poured concrete, had hardened so that
overruling Brown v. Board could not restore the status quo ante. Nor did
I thereby "acknowledge" the doctrine, or seek to "maintain" it but,
recognizing that the situation it had created could not be unfrozen, I
said "Go and sin no more." For Brest this is a "sort of statute of
limitations,"2 22 but as the Supreme Court declared, "[t]he past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration." 223 All the more this is
true when the past cannot be unrolled, when to apply an unconstitution-
al doctrine in ever expanding fashion, for example, to insist on
court-administered schools and reverse discrimination, is to compound
the initial offense.
This by no means exhausts the catalog of Brest's distortions and
misrepresentations, but it should suffice to show that he is either
unwilling or unable to accept unpalatable facts, a prime requisite of
scholarly inquiry.
Conclusion
Unlike some of his activist brethren, who still seek to root the
Court's contra-constitutional decrees in the Constitution - "open-ended
terms," an "invitation" to import extra-constitutional considerations -
Brest boldly strikes the shackles of the Constitution:2 24 it is not binding
on judges or other public officials. Like Samson he brings down the
pillars of the temple, for on his theory judicial decrees are no more
222. Id.
223. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940).
Chief Justice Marshall stated: "The past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power."
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 122 (1810). Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
625-29 (1965) held that courts are empowered "to make law effective for the future only."
224. For the Founders:
[Government] must be limited in many ways; it must be checked at every possible
point; it must be at all times under suspicion. . . . Too much emphasis cannot well be
laid upon the fear which the 'Fathers' had of government. To them the great lesson of
history was, that government always tends to become oppressive, and that it was the
greatest foe of individual liberty.
C. MERRIAM, AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 77 (1906). The colonists were haunted by the
aggressiveness of power, "its endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond
legitimate boundaries." B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
56-57 (1967). Hence, as Jefferson explained, "limited constitutions" were designed "to
bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power," to "bind [them] down from
mischief by the chains of the Constitution." 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (1836). A veteran
British political scientist, Professor Max Beloff, concluded, "It is better so." Beloff, Arbiters
of American Destiny, THE TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION Supp. II, April 7, 1978, London.
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binding than the Constitution which gives them life. He tacitly
confesses that the Constitution does not authorize the Court to impose
its extra-constitutional values on the people, but justifies on the ground
that judges have been doing so and are especially "competent" to
discover and apply "fundamental values." It betrays the poverty of the
activist cause that a leading spokesman should maintain that expertise
confers power, that courts may thrust aside constitutional limitations
because they have decided they are most qualified to govern, a
transparent apology for an imperial judiciary. Nevertheless, Brest
performs a service in underlining the central issue: where is the Court
empowered to reverse the Framers' determinations? Exaltation of courts
over Constitution is a tenet of the "New Faith";22 5 but as Justice, then
Professor Hans Linde, wrote, the "whole enterprise of constitutional law
rests, after all, on the premise that the nation cares about its
Constitution, not about its courts., 2 2 6 Let but the people realize that
they are the victims of a silent "revolution, 227 that has deprived them of
self-government, and government by judiciary will come to a jarring
halt.
225. An activist apostle, Professor Stanley Kutler, wrote that prior to 1937 academe
"accused judges [of]... arrogat[ing] a policy-making function not conferred upon them by
the Constitution," which negated the basic principles of representative government.
Thereafter most of the judiciary's longtime critics suddenly found a "new faith," matching
a "new libertarianism" with an "activist judiciary to protect those values." Kutler, supra
note 22, at 512-13.
226. Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 256 (1972).
227. Kelly, supra note 22, at 158: the Warren Court was "[determined] to carry
through a constitutional equalitarian revolution .. " See also Kutler, supra note 22.
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